# HOUSE BILL 42

D5 HB 1350/14 – HGO

By: **Delegates Rosenberg, Carter, Oaks, Pena-Melnyk, and Tarlau** Introduced and read first time: January 16, 2015 Assigned to: Health and Government Operations

## A BILL ENTITLED

1 AN ACT concerning

### Fair Employment Preservation Act of 2015

- FOR the purpose of providing that an employer is liable under certain circumstances in an
   action concerning a violation of certain provisions of law based on the creation or
   continuation of a hostile work environment; providing for the application of this Act;
   and generally relating to discrimination and retaliation in employment.
- 7 BY adding to

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- 8 Article State Government
- 9 Section 20–610
- 10 Annotated Code of Maryland
- 11 (2009 Replacement Volume and 2014 Supplement)
- 12 Preamble

13 WHEREAS, The State of Maryland seeks to provide increased protections to 14 employees who are the victims of discrimination in the workplace; and

WHEREAS, The laws of Maryland governing employment discrimination have been based, in large part, on federal statutory provisions, and decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court interpreting those federal laws may have implications for the interpretation of Maryland's fair employment laws; and

WHEREAS, The Supreme Court's decision in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007), significantly impaired federal statutory protections against discrimination in employment by allowing employees who are the victims of discrimination only a limited opportunity under the Civil Rights Act to seek relief for their unequal pay; and

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1 WHEREAS, The General Assembly of Maryland responded by passing the Lilly 2 Ledbetter Civil Rights Restoration Act of 2009 (Chapters 56 and 57 of the Acts of the 3 General Assembly of 2009); and

WHEREAS, The Lilly Ledbetter Civil Rights Restoration Act of 2009 allowed employees who are the victims of discrimination greater relief by ensuring that each discriminating paycheck constitutes a separate act of discrimination; and

WHEREAS, Federal protection against discriminatory actions were again impaired
by the Supreme Court in Vance v. Ball State University, 133 S.Ct. 2434 (2013); and

9 WHEREAS, The Supreme Court ruled in Vance that under Title VII of the Civil 10 Rights Act of 1964 an employer is vicariously liable for hostile work environment 11 harassment by a supervisor only if the supervisor has the power to effect a significant 12 change in employment status, including hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment to 13 a position with significantly different responsibilities, or a significant change in benefits; 14 and

WHEREAS, The Supreme Court's decision in Vance weakens protections from supervisor harassment that the Supreme Court established in Faragher v. Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998) and Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998), which held that an employer may be vicariously liable under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for hostile work environment harassment of an employee by an individual that has supervisory authority over that employee; and

WHEREAS, In Faragher and Ellerth, the Supreme Court held that a strict liability standard applies to harassment that results in a tangible employment action, but that when supervisors perpetrate harassment that creates a hostile work environment, but does not result in a tangible employment action, an employer is vicariously liable unless the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct any harassing behavior, and the plaintiff unreasonably failed to take advantage of the preventive or corrective opportunities that the employer provided; and

WHEREAS, The Supreme Court holding in Vance limiting the definition of "supervisor" to those employees with the authority to take tangible employment actions against their victims ignores the fact that very often supervisors who direct daily work activities, but who do not have the authority to take tangible employment actions, wield significant power over their subordinates; and

WHEREAS, Justice Ginsburg dissented in Vance, asserting that an employer is liable for hostile work environment harassment by a supervisor if the supervisor has the power to direct the work of other employees; and

WHEREAS, The General Assembly believes that the legal standards and burdens developed and applied by the courts with respect to claims brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., 42 U.S.C. 1983, Title 20,

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1 Subtitle 6 of the State Government Article, and Article 46 of the Maryland Declaration of 2 Rights prior to the Vance decision should be preserved; and

3 WHEREAS, It is the intent of the General Assembly that the standards set forth in 4 this Act shall be interpreted and applied for these claims in a manner consistent with legal 5 precedent developed by the Maryland and federal courts before the issuance of the Vance 6 decision; now, therefore,

SECTION 1. BE IT ENACTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF MARYLAND,
That the Laws of Maryland read as follows:

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#### Article - State Government

10 **20–610.** 

IN AN ACTION CONCERNING A VIOLATION OF THIS SUBTITLE BASED ON QUID
 PRO QUO HARASSMENT OR THE CREATION OR CONTINUATION OF HARASSMENT IN A
 HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT, AN EMPLOYER IS LIABLE:

14(1) FOR THE ACTS OR OMISSIONS TOWARD AN EMPLOYEE OR15APPLICANT FOR EMPLOYMENT OF AN INDIVIDUAL WHO:

16 (I) UNDERTAKES OR RECOMMENDS TANGIBLE EMPLOYMENT 17 ACTIONS AFFECTING THE EMPLOYEE OR AN APPLICANT FOR EMPLOYMENT, 18 INCLUDING HIRING, FIRING, PROMOTING, DEMOTING, AND REASSIGNING THE 19 EMPLOYEE OR AN APPLICANT FOR EMPLOYMENT; OR

20 (II) DIRECTS, SUPERVISES, OR EVALUATES THE WORK 21 ACTIVITIES OF THE EMPLOYEE; OR

(2) IF THE NEGLIGENCE OF THE EMPLOYER LED TO THE CREATION OR
 CONTINUATION OF QUID PRO QUO HARASSMENT OR HARASSMENT IN A HOSTILE
 WORK ENVIRONMENT.

25 SECTION 2. AND BE IT FURTHER ENACTED, That this Act shall be construed to 26 apply only prospectively and may not be applied or interpreted to have any effect on or 27 application to any cause of action arising before the effective date of this Act.

28 SECTION 3. AND BE IT FURTHER ENACTED, That this Act shall take effect 29 October 1, 2015.