

Chair William C. Smith 2 East Miller Senate Office Building Annapolis, Maryland 21401

SB156 - Civil Actions - Specialties - Statute of Limitations **Testimony on Behalf of** MD|DC Credit Union Association **Position:** Oppose

Chair Smith, Vice-Chair Waldstreicher, and Members of the Committee:

The MD|DC Credit Union Association, on behalf of the 70+ Credit Unions and their 2.2 million members that we represent in the State of Maryland, appreciates the opportunity to testify on this legislation. Credit Unions are member-owned, not-for-profit financial cooperatives whose mission is to educate and help members achieve financial well-being. **We respectfully oppose this bill.**

Our opposition to this bill stems solely from the legal principle of finality. When a credit union, or a third-party collector used by a credit union, enforces a judgment or takes action on a promissory note, we need to know that we can move on in a timely manner after resolution. Judge Booth, who sits on the Maryland Court of Appeals, in her opinion in Cain v. Midland funding (the holding of which this bill is directed to abrogate), provided a clear and detailed explanation of the principle of finality concerning this very statute. This holding and the underlying principles should be protected.

There is a difference in the statute of limitations for a judgment creditor enforcing a judgment against the debtor (12 years) and the ability of a judgment debtor to assert a claim against a judgment creditor for a matter arising out of the entry of a judgment (3 years). The argument is that this is unfair; however, the history and rationale behind this difference in limitation periods paints a different picture.

As the court found in Cain v. Midland funding:

"The language in the original specialties statute clearly contemplated a 12-year statute of limitations for actions on a judgment brought *against* a judgment debtor. There is nothing in the prior version of the statute that could be construed to establish a 12-year statute of limitations for a judgment debtor to assert a claim against a judgment creditor for a matter arising out of the entry of a judgment."¹

¹ Cain v. Midland Funding, LLC, 256 A.3d 765, 788 (Md. 2021)



Continuing, the court explains that the differentiation in the statute of limitations length was not an oversight by the legislature; this is settled law, affirmed by the Supreme Court.

"Our interpretation of the plain language of CJ § 5-102(a)(3) —as establishing a 12-year statute of limitations only to *enforce* a judgment and not establishing the same period to *challenge* a judgment—is consistent with principles of finality expressed by the Supreme Court and by this Court for over a century."²

The rationale is simple. The 12-year statute of limitations period for enforcement is meant to protect consumers.

"The competing construction—that the General Assembly would establish a longer limitations period only to *enforce* a judgment—is consistent with the general purpose of collection laws, which enable judgments to be paid over a longer time period thereby ensuring that payment is not unduly burdensome to a judgment debtor."³

The 3-year statute of limitation to challenge a judgment provides creditors a standard and reasonable timeline to move on after resolution. This, as referenced above, is the well-settled principle of finality.

"[i]t is most desirable of course that there should be an end to litigation, and a judgment is presumed to be a settlement of all matters in dispute in that particular case; and once entered, parties are no longer under the necessity of preserving the evidences upon which their claims rested."⁴

Thank you for your consideration. We appreciate the ability to voice our concerns and look forward to a continued partnership. Please do not hesitate to contact me at 443-325-0774 or <u>ibratsakis@mddccua.org</u>, should you have any questions.

Sincerely,

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² Cain v. Midland Funding, LLC, 256 A.3d 765, 788-89 (Md. 2021)

³ Cain v. Midland Funding, LLC, 256 A.3d 765, 789-90 (Md. 2021)

⁴ Id. (citing Abell v. Simon , 49 Md. 318, 324 (1878)