I urge an unfavorable report on [Senate bill 1 (https://mgaleg.maryland.gov/2023RS/bills/sb/sb0001F.pdf)](https://mgaleg.maryland.gov/2023RS/bills/sb/sb0001F.pdf).

This bill has no chance of passing Constitutional muster and essentially ignores the [NYSR&PA v. Bruen decision by the Supreme Court of the U.S (https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/21pdf/20-843_7j80.pdf)](https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/21pdf/20-843_7j80.pdf).

Specifically, the statement from Justice Thomas regarding “sensitive places”:

“...expanding the category of “sensitive places” simply to all places of public congregation that are not isolated from law enforcement defines the category of “sensitive places” far too broadly.”

The full passage of the decision pertaining to “sensitive places” can be found on [pages 27 and 28 of the ruling (https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/21pdf/20-843_7j80.pdf)](https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/21pdf/20-843_7j80.pdf), which I include below:

> Consider, for example, Heller’s discussion of “longstanding” “laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings.” 554 U. S., at 626. Although the historical record yields relatively few 18th- and 19th-century “sensitive places” where weapons were altogether prohibited—e.g., legislative assemblies, polling places, and courthouses—we are also aware of no disputes regarding the lawfulness of such prohibitions. See D. Kopel & J. Greenlee, The “Sensitive Places” Doctrine, 13 Charleston L. Rev. 205, 229–236, 244– 247 (2018); see also Brief for Independent Institute as Amicus Curiae 11–17. We therefore can assume it settled that these locations were “sensitive places” where arms carrying could be prohibited consistent with the Second Amendment. And courts can use analogies to those historical regulations of “sensitive places” to determine that modern regulations prohibiting the carry of firearms in new and analogous sensitive places are constitutionally permissible. Although we have no occasion to comprehensively define “sensitive places” in this case, we do think respondents err in their attempt to characterize New York’s proper-cause requirement as a “sensitive-place” law. In their view, “sensitive places” where the government may lawfully disarm law-abiding citizens include all “places where people typically congregate and where law-enforcement and other public-safety professionals are presumptively available.” Brief for Respondents 34. It is true that people sometimes congregate in “sensitive places,” and it is likewise true that law enforcement professionals are usually presumptively available in those locations. But expanding the category of “sensitive places” simply to all places of public congregation that are not isolated from law enforcement defines the category of “sensitive places” far too broadly. Respondents’ argument would in effect exempt cities from the Second Amendment and would eviscerate the general right to publicly carry arms for self-defense that we discuss in detail below. See Part III–B, infra. Put simply, there is no historical basis for New York to effectively declare the island of Manhattan a “sensitive place” simply because it is crowded and protected generally by the New York City Police Department.

Again, I urge you to recognize the unconstitutionality of SB001 and provide an unfavorable review accordingly.

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