

1 **COMMITTEE:** ECONOMIC MATTERS

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3 **TESTIMONY ON:** HB 419

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5 **POSITION:** OPPOSE

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7 **HEARING DATE:** FEBRUARY 6, 2025

8 Washington Gas respectfully submits this statement in **OPPOSITION** to **House Bill 419-**
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10 **Natural Gas- Strategic Infrastructure Development and Enhancement (Ratepayer**
11 **Protection Act)**

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14 **Introduction**

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16 My name is Cynthia L. Quarterman, and I am an independent consultant to Washington
17 Gas Light Company ("Washington Gas" or "Company"). I served as the Administrator
18 of the US Department of Transportation's ("DOT") Pipeline and Hazardous Materials
19 Safety Administration ("PHMSA") from November 2009 through October 2014.¹
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21 PHMSA is responsible for oversight of the safe transportation of oil, gas and other
22 hazardous materials by all modes of transportation, including pipelines. During my
23 tenure at PHMSA, I spearheaded DOT's Call to Action, which encouraged state
24 legislatures and public utility commissions to remove high-risk materials expeditiously
25 from natural gas systems around the United States. PHMSA enthusiastically endorsed
this legislature's adoption of the Strategic Infrastructure Development and
Enhancement Plan Act ("STRIDE") in 2013. A representative of PHMSA's staff testified
before the Maryland legislature at the time encouraging STRIDE's adoption. This

¹ Attached as an exhibit is a copy of my Curriculum Vitae.

1 legislature should be proud of its leadership in improving pipeline safety in Maryland,
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3 and I encourage it not to abandon that course.
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6 The purpose of my testimony is to discuss PHMSA's Call-To-Action and the history
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8 surrounding that critical safety initiative and to encourage the continued support for
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10 the STRIDE Act. Removing vintage and vulnerable materials on an accelerated basis is
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12 sound public policy that is imperative to pipeline safety in Maryland. Not only is it
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14 prudent to continue STRIDE without any additional roadblocks that could slow pipe
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16 replacement, it could be catastrophic if Maryland adopted a "fix it first" strategy that
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18 delayed replacement of vulnerable facilities and resulted in a pipeline-related incident.

History of The Call to Action

19 The first and foremost mission of PHMSA is ensuring pipeline safety. During my
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21 tenure as PHMSA Administrator, I witnessed several low probability, high
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23 consequence oil and natural gas pipeline incidents that destroyed communities
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25 and caused catastrophic injuries and deaths. One of those natural gas incidents
occurred on September 10, 2010, when a longitudinal seam on a 1956 era, non-
industry standard steel natural gas transmission pipeline operated by PG&E
ruptured and devastated an entire neighborhood in San Bruno, California, injuring
51 people, killing 8 and destroying 38 homes. Then on January 18, 2011, a break
on a 1942 vintage 12-inch cast iron distribution main caused an explosion and
death of a utility worker in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Shortly thereafter, on
February 9, 2011, there was a catastrophic incident on a 1928 vintage 12-inch
cast iron distribution main operated by UGI in Allentown, Pennsylvania, injuring 3

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1 people, killing 5 and destroying 8 homes. The then-Secretary of Transportation,
2 Ray LaHood, and I visited the communities in San Bruno and Allentown, met with
3 those affected and saw first-hand the destruction that can occur from a natural
4 gas incident. Although the authority to oversee those pipelines had been
5 delegated to state oversight agencies, such as the Maryland Public Service
6 Commission,² so many harrowing pipeline incidents within a few months span
7 caused the Department of Transportation to lead a nationwide Call to Action to
8 replace, repair and/or rehabilitate the highest risk pipelines in April 2011.³
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14 As a part of that Call to Action, PHMSA chaired multiple meetings to listen to
15 stakeholder concerns and encouraged expedited removal of the highest risk pipe.
16 The materials targeted specifically included cast and wrought iron, bare steel,
17 copper, and certain kinds of welded pipe.⁴ Secretary LaHood and I also delivered
18 speeches before, and entreaties to, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
19 ("FERC"), the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners
20 ("NARUC") and individual state utility commissions to ask for their support in
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25 ² In accepting the responsibility to assume pipeline safety authority in Maryland, the Public Service Commission has accepted the responsibility to adopt the federal minimum safety regulations and guidelines issued by PHMSA, as well as the authority to issue additional or more stringent requirements for intrastate pipelines. Maryland has used that authority to issue its own pipeline safety laws and regulations compatible with those of PHMSA. Pub. Util. Art. Annotated Code of MD, Sections 2-113, 2-117(a), 2-121, 5-101, 11-102, 12-101 through 113 & 13-203; COMAR Title 20, Subtitles 55-57. Any interpretation of a regulation must be consistent with PHMSA's. See Guidelines for States Participating in the Pipeline Safety Program, revised Jan. 1, 2024 at 17, <https://www.PHMSA.dot.gov/sites/PHMSA.dot.gov/Files/2024-State-Guidelines-with-Appendices-2023-12-18.pdf>.

³ See DOT News Release, "US Transportation Secretary Ray LaHood Announces Pipeline Safety Action Plan," <https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/sites/phmsa.dot.gov/files/docs/dot4111.pdf> (hereinafter "DOT Call to Action News Release").

⁴ See U.S. Department of Transportation Call to Action to Improve the Safety of the Nation's Energy Pipeline System, <https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/sites/phmsa.dot.gov/files/docs/Action%20Plan%20Executive%20Version%201%20NOV%2011.pdf>.

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1 identifying high-risk pipelines and accelerating pipeline replacement projects
2 through appropriate rate recovery mechanisms. PHMSA Staff members also
3 provided testimony before state legislatures, including here in Maryland,
4 encouraging them to enact laws to expedite the removal of high-risk pipe.⁵
5 Mechanisms such as STRIDE remove operational and funding barriers to pipe
6 replacement, allowing utilities to do work that is critical to public safety as fast as
7 possible.
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13 PHMSA's outreach to NARUC and state commissioners was deemed critical to
14 the success of the initiative, so critical that Transportation Secretary LaHood
15 addressed the NARUC general assembly personally and I addressed the NARUC
16 Gas Committee and met with the FERC Chair and staff. The reason was because
17 the Department recognized that in order to make the Call to Action succeed, it
18 needed the commitment of states to dedicate themselves to prioritizing safe
19 pipelines for the public. Pipeline operators must have an environment that lowers
20 operating and funding barriers that could delay the replacement of high-risk
21 pipelines. Because of the time delay in recovering costs using traditional
22 ratemaking authority, the Department encouraged alternative expedited funding
23 mechanisms such as the one adopted here in Maryland. Fortunately, some states
24 had already recognized the need for accelerated action and there were several
25 approaches for operators to consider when asking for additional funds to replace
aging infrastructure more quickly than previously planned. Maryland joined those

⁵ See Testimony of Linda Dougherty, PHMSA Pipeline Safety Deputy Administrator for Programs, [HTTPS://mgahouse.Maryland.gov/mga/play/36ec44e5420945288e70a25d4641def21d?catalog/03e481c7-8a42-4438-a7da-93ff74bdaa4c&playfrom=2992130](https://mgahouse.Maryland.gov/mga/play/36ec44e5420945288e70a25d4641def21d?catalog/03e481c7-8a42-4438-a7da-93ff74bdaa4c&playfrom=2992130).

1 states in 2013 when it enacted the STRIDE Act.
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5 In my capacity as Administrator, I and members of PHMSA's staff sent letters to
6 every state (including Maryland) with a pipeline safety program asking for the
7 current status of pipeline infrastructure and plans to expedite high-risk pipeline
8 removal. In July 2012, Maryland Public Service Commission then-Chairman
9 Nazarian updated PHMSA on the status of the state's aging distribution
10 infrastructure.⁶ At that time, there were 360 miles of bare steel main, 2 miles of
11 ductile iron main and 1,422 miles of cast iron main.⁷ The Commission reported
12 that it had been "actively pressing Maryland's gas distribution companies to
13 accelerate the replacement of cast iron, ductile iron and bare steel mains."⁸ It
14 further stated that the operators had "triaged these replacements based on risk
15 analysis and the determination that within Maryland bare steel is a greater threat
16 than cast iron. However, that does not mean that they are ignoring their cast iron
17 mains."⁹ The reported infrastructure removal programs of Maryland's six
18 operators varied from 5 years to an undetermined date, with the vast majority of
19 the cast iron pipe in the undetermined timeline. The Maryland legislature itself
20 responded strongly by enacting the STRIDE Act in 2013, allowing utilities to
21 accelerate replacement of the state's vintage high-risk pipe. By adopting
22 STRIDE, Maryland was in good company with forty-one states and the District of
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⁶ See Letter from Maryland Public Service Commission Chairmand Douglas Nazarian to David Appelbaum, PHMSA Office of Pipeline Safety date July 11, 2012.

⁷*Id.*

⁸ *Id.*

⁹ *Id.*

1 Columbia that also established some sort of state infrastructure replacement
2 funding mechanism as of 2019.¹⁰ Maryland natural gas utilities have replaced
3 over 500 miles of distribution infrastructure and more than 100,000 individual
4 services through STRIDE.
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9 **Materials Targeted in Call to Action**

10 The 2011 Call to Action came on the heels of seismic change in the views of
11 safety regulators in light of increasingly undeniable evidence. Specifically, while
12 there had historically been a rule of thumb that many pipeline materials had an
13 approximate life span in the 50 to 60 year time frame, the philosophy had changed
14 to suggest that as long as a pipeline asset was well maintained and subject to
15 good operating conditions, its life might be indefinite. Nonetheless, incident data
16 pointed to serious concerns about certain pipeline materials that had been
17 installed during earlier eras of pipeline construction. The Call to Action arose from
18 an assessment of the accumulating evidence. Distribution lines were especially
19 targeted because of their proximity to the public. The closer a pipeline is to a
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25 ¹⁰ See American Gas Association, "State Infrastructure Replacement Activity" Report, Oct. 21, 2019, <https://www.AGA.org/WP-content/uploads/2022/11/agastatereplacementactivity.docx>; see also National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners, "Natural Gas Distribution Infrastructure Replacement and Modernization; A Review of State Programs" report, January 2020, https://pubs.naruc.org/pub/45E90C1E-155D-0A36-31FE-A68E6BF430EE?_gl=1*15x86qv*_ga*NzcwODg5NzI2LjE2ODQ0Mjg0NDI.*_ga_QLH1N3Q1NF*MTY5Mjg5NTExOS4yNTguMS4xNjkyODE1Mzg2LjAuMC4w; see also examples of local distribution companies' programs to expedite removal of cast iron and unprotected steel pipelines, Department of Energy, Office of Energy Policy and Systems Analysis, "Natural Gas Infrastructure Modernization Programs at Local Distribution Companies: Key Issues and Considerations" January 2017 at 31-2, Table 2, <https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2017/01/f34/natural%20gas%20infrastructure%20modernization%20programs%20at%20local%20distribution%20companies---key%20issues%20and%20considerations.pdf> (hereinafter "DOE Modernization Analysis")

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1 residence, business, or gathering place, the more likely an incident is to cause
2 injury or death. In 2011, when the Call to Action was issued, it was apparent that
3 many natural gas distribution pipelines were still relying on pipeline assets that
4 were well beyond their initially forecasted life span.
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9 The Call to Action targeted the highest risk pipelines for repair, replacement or
10 rehabilitation, but there were certain pipeline materials that were deemed inherently
11 unsafe based on past experience and data. Included among that designation was bare
12 steel pipe, cast and wrought iron pipe and certain early vintage plastic pipes. Cast iron
13 pipe has been of particular concern. As a pipeline material, cast iron presents special
14 challenges. It is an alloy of iron and carbon, which may not appear to be damaged when
15 it corrodes, but leaves "a brittle sponge-like structure of graphite flakes."¹¹ "A
16 completely graphitized buried cast iron pipe may hold gas under pressure but will
17 fracture under a minor impact, such as being hit by a workman's shovel."¹² Such
18 graphitization "allows far more dramatic failure modes such as rapid crack propagation,
19 and circumferential breaks. Such failures are potentially more severe than more ductile
20 failure modes commonly seen in today's pipe materials."¹³ To further complicate things,
21 cast iron cannot be welded or cut during repairs. In addition, special measures are
22 required to protect cast iron pipelines that have been disturbed. These measures,
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¹¹ See PHMSA Guidance Manual for Operators of Small Natural Gas Systems, January 2017 at III-5,
https://www.PHMSA.dot.gov/sites/phmsa.dot.gov/files/doc/small_natural_gas_operator_guide_%28january_2017%29.pdf.

¹² *Id.*

¹³ See PHMSA Part 192 Corrosion Enforcement Guidance at 150,
https://www.PHMSA.dot.gov/sites/PHMSA.dot.gov/files/docs/corrosion_enforcement_guidance'part192_12_7_2015.pdf.

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1 including an elaborate series of efforts to protect it from damage from vibration, impact,
2 earth movement, outside forces, and future excavations, must be invoked as well as
3 permanent protection from external loads.¹⁴ The mere exposure of cast iron to
4 investigate its condition can lead to leaks that could pose a threat to public safety. The
5 special measures required near cast iron pipe make it a difficult material to work around
6 in the modern underground. Said more simply, cast iron should not be repaired; it must
7 be replaced.
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13 Replacement – not repair – is consistent with long-standing federal safety standards.
14 Dating back to the early 1990's, the National Transportation Safety Board ("NTSB")
15 issued recommendations to PHMSA's predecessor agency, the Research and Special
16 Programs Administration ("RSPA"), to:
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20 Require each gas operator to implement a program, based on
21 factors such as age, pipe diameter, operating pressure, soil
22 corrosiveness, existing graphite damage, leak history, burial depth,
23 and external loading, to **identify and replace in a planned, timely**
24 **manner cast-iron piping systems that may threaten public**
25 **safety.**¹⁵

RSPA issued twin safety alerts echoing the NTSB's recommendations and reminding operators that "[c]urrent pipeline safety regulations require that cast iron pipe on which general graphitization is found to a degree where a fracture might result **must be**

¹⁴ See 49 C.F.R. 192.755.

¹⁵ See NTSB Pipeline Accident Brief No. DCA90FP001 (Aug. 6, 1991) (emphasis added)<https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/sites/phmsa.dot.gov/files/docs/NTSB%20Recommendation%20to%20RSPA%20P91-12.pdf>.

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1 **replaced.”**¹⁶ In addition, even if there is no immediate hazard, but the pipe is in
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3 unsatisfactory condition, the operator is **required to initiate a program to recondition**
4 **or phase out the pipe involved.**¹⁷ Finally, it noted, any excavated cast iron pipe must be
5 protected against damage, such as enumerated above.¹⁸
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9 Those decades old safety alerts remain in effect and are relevant to this day. What they
10 do not address is the practicalities of how to identify and survey effectively long buried
11 cast iron pipe that has not been exposed for another reason. Following the 2011
12 Philadelphia and Allentown incidents, PHMSA issued a further advisory bulletin
13 regarding cast iron distribution pipe.¹⁹ That advisory bulletin urged a comprehensive
14 review of an operator’s cast iron pipeline replacement program “to accelerate pipeline
15 repair, rehabilitation, and replacement of aging and high-risk pipe” and to “develop and
16 continually update and follow their plans[,] and **consider establishment of mandated**
17 **replacement programs.”**²⁰ Fortunately, most states, including Maryland, rose to the
18 occasion and put in place programs focused on replacing the vintage high-risk materials
19 such as cast iron.
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¹⁶ See RSPA Alert Notice, ALN-92-02 (Jun. 26, 1992), <https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/sites/phmsa.dot.gov/files/docs/RSPA%20Alert%20Notice%2092-02.pdf>, see also RSPA Alert Notice (Oct.11, 1991)(requiring identification and replacement of cast iron piping systems that may threaten public safety), <https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/sites/phmsa.dot.gov/files/docs/RSPA%20Alert%20Notice%2091-02.pdf>; 49 C.F.R. 192.489.

¹⁷ *Id.*

¹⁸ *Id.*

¹⁹ See PHMSA Pipeline Safety: Cast Iron Pipe (Supplementary Advisory Bulletin), 77 Fed. Reg. 57 at 17119 (Mar. 23, 2012), <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2012-03-23/pdf/2012-7080.pdf>.

²⁰ *Id.* at 17120.

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3 More recently, cast iron incidents have continued to occur, causing fatalities and injuries.
4 The causes include rainfall after drought conditions, earth movement, freeze-thaw
5 cycles, water erosion, improper backfill and compaction causing overload conditions,
6 subsidence (*i.e.*, ground shifting), and leaks at joints.²¹ This performance is consistent
7 with what DOT noted in its report on “The State of the National Pipeline Infrastructure”
8 in 2011:
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12 One material that continues to be the focus of concern is cast
13 iron...the small diameter cast iron pipes have low beam strength
14 and are particularly susceptible to stresses from underground
15 disturbances, such as ground movement, freeze-thaw cycles, soil
16 erosion, undermining due to water main breaks, or nearby
17 excavation activities. Most cast iron problems have been with
18 small diameter, thin wall pipe. Larger, heavier pipe typically
19 performs well, especially if not subject to graphitization...and when
20 they have limited exposure to excavation damage.²²

21 These incidents point to the relative fragility of cast iron pipes and the importance of
22 their expedited removal.
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25 Cast iron is not the only material that contributes to the threat to public safety.
The Call to Action targeted all high-risk materials in the Nation’s pipeline system
that had been deemed over time to be obsolete or had a history of poor
performance. After construction of cast and wrought iron pipe began to be phased
out, bare or uncoated steel pipe became the material of choice on distribution

²¹ See PHMSA Cast Iron Inventory.

²² [HTTPS://www.PHMSA.dot.gov/sites/PHMSA.dot.gov/files/docs/secretarys%20infrastructure%20report_revised%20per%20phc_103111.pdf](https://www.PHMSA.dot.gov/sites/PHMSA.dot.gov/files/docs/secretarys%20infrastructure%20report_revised%20per%20phc_103111.pdf). See

1 pipelines up until around the early 1960s, when plastic pipe became available,
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3 and the early 1970s, when regulations required steel pipe to be coated. The
4 absence of any coating on a steel pipe to protect it from corrosion caused by its
5 environment can lead to consequential failures. Certain early vintage plastic pipe,
6 installed from the 1960s to the early 1980s, have also been found to be vulnerable
7 to brittle-like cracking. In addition to particular pipe materials, certain construction
8 practices, such as dated welding and joining techniques, have been found to lead
9 to leaks.
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14 These concerns have only increased since. Although cast iron distribution mains
15 only account for 1% of all distribution mains, they are responsible for 9% of all
16 main-related incidents.²³ Cast and wrought iron main incidents are also twice as
17 likely to cause fatalities and injuries (38% vs 19% on mains made of other
18 materials).²⁴ Moreover, cast and wrought iron mains account for disproportionate
19 numbers of fatalities and injuries on gas distribution mains (34% vs 16% on other
20 mains).²⁵ These failure data led to the Call to Action.
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Achievements of the Call to Action and the STRIDE Act

In the US, pipelines were first installed in the 19th Century to transport

²³ See PHMSA Cast and Wrought Iron Inventory, <https://www.PHMSA.dot.gov/data-and-statistics/pipeline-replacement/cast-and-wrought-iron-inventory>, (hereinafter "PHMSA Cast Iron Inventory").

²⁴ *Id.*

²⁵ *Id.*

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1 manufactured gas to fuel gas streetlights in Baltimore, Maryland. Eventually,
2 natural gas was produced and used for heating, and pipelines proliferated in the
3 early 1900s. Prior to the 1940s, those early systems – such as the systems
4 constructed in Maryland and Washington, D.C. – and the initial pipes were made
5 of cast or wrought iron and, later, bare steel pipe. At the time of the Call to Action,
6 in 2011, more than 50% of the nation’s active pipelines were constructed before
7 the 1970’s in response to the post-World War II building boom. The first pipeline
8 safety standards were not adopted until 1968, meaning any pipelines constructed
9 before then were not subject to any standardized safety requirements. Not
10 surprisingly, the earliest heavily populated cities and states are home to some of
11 the oldest and highest number of pipeline miles made of high-risk material. As a
12 first adopter, Maryland is one of those places, and today it currently relies on the
13 6th largest percentage (6.1% cast iron) of the highest-risk distribution main
14 pipeline materials in the nation to serve its energy needs.
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23 At the end of 2011, there were 33,669 miles of cast/wrought iron gas distribution main
24 and 15,408 service pipelines, or approximately 3% of the national gas distribution
25 system.²⁶ Since the Call to Action, as of the end of 2023, there remained 15,872 miles
of cast/wrought iron main and 6,694 services, or approximately 1% of the gas
distribution system. In other words, more than 50% of cast and wrought iron mains
and services in the United States have been retired since the Call to Action.²⁷ There

²⁶ See https://portal.PHMSA.dot.gov/analytics/sawdill?portalpages&portalpath=%2fshared%2fpdm%20public%20website%2fci%20miles%2fgd_cast_iron (hereinafter “PHMSA Cast Iron Analytics”).

²⁷ *Id.*

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1 are now 24 states and one territory that have completely eliminated cast and wrought
2 iron gas distribution pipelines.²⁸ If one looks back to the three states specifically cited
3 by PHMSA as having excessively long cast iron replacement programs, one finds that
4 in the twelve years between 2011 and 2023, Pennsylvania (with formerly a 100 year
5 program), New York (with a former 80 year program), and Connecticut (with a former
6 79 year program) managed to retire 41, 47 and 38 percent of their cast iron main,
7 respectively, which, if they continue the pace, will have them complete removal in less
8 than 32 years. That is an astounding achievement for pipeline safety.
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14 The eight states with more miles of cast iron mains than Maryland in 2011 (accounting
15 for 24,290 miles or 72% of all the nation's cast iron mains), have since successfully
16 reduced their cast iron mileage by 53.5% (to 12,994 miles), which is above the national
17 average.²⁹ By comparison, Maryland has 67% of its cast or wrought iron mains from
18 2011 remaining, leaving it somewhat behind the average of other states, including
19 those with the most mileage in 2011, in removing cast iron pipes.³⁰ Maryland must
20 continue to pursue the expedited removal of cast iron, including eliminating barriers
21 that slow the pace of removal of cast iron where they exist.
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Similar to cast and wrought iron, at the time of the Call to Action, 63,019 miles of bare steel distribution main pipe and 2,859,197 services were in use. As of the end of 2023, there were 35,126 miles of bare steel distribution main and 1,390,774

²⁸ See PHMSA Cast Iron Inventory.

²⁹ See PHMSA Cast Iron Analytics.

³⁰ *Id.*

1 bare steel services remaining. That amounts to a decrease of 44% in bare steel
2 mains and 51% in services.
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6 Compared to other jurisdictions, Maryland had a relatively small inventory of bare
7 steel pipe with 106.56 (0.7%) miles of mains and 51,392 (4.7%) services as of the
8 end of 2023. That is down from 361 main miles and 97,448 services in 2011,
9 approximately a 70.5% and 47.2% decrease of bare steel main miles and
10 services, respectively. So, great progress has been made in removing bare steel
11 pipelines, especially with respect to mains, from the Maryland systems compared
12 to the remainder of the country. This legislature should be proud of that
13 achievement and stay the course.
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19 **Leak Repairs of High-Risk Pipe Are Not Long-Term or Cost-Effective Solutions**
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21 As mentioned above, these high-risk pipeline materials have been in use well beyond
22 their intended life span and may require extraordinary measures once they are
23 disturbed. Allowing such safety conditions to persist until a leak occurs would be
24 imprudent and could be catastrophic as indicated by past fatalities and injuries related
25 to cast iron pipelines. PHMSA has two separate safety programs that gas utilities must
comply with: one is for repair of leaking facilities; the other require the proactive
identification and replacement of pipes. For the first program, PHMSA requires that
pipeline operators survey their distribution pipelines periodically, identify leaks and
repair them based on the urgency of the leak. The repair of those leaks is within the
operator's regular operating and maintenance requirements. By contrast, accelerating
the replacement or rehabilitation of the highest-risk pipe addressed in PHMSA's Call

1 to Action requires operators to take extraordinary action beyond the wait-and-see
2 approach of merely plugging leaks. Wise safety management mandates a more
3 proactive replacement-focused approach. Solely repairing vintage facilities does not
4 accomplish PHMSA's pipeline safety objectives.
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9 There is no question that replacing high-risk pipeline materials in Maryland has been
10 and will be expensive. However, when it comes to pipelines, safety must be
11 Maryland's top priority. I understand the desire to focus on the cost of replacing
12 pipelines and how that might affect rates. But there are also costs associated with
13 ignoring safety needs that could lead to catastrophic pipeline incident-related injuries
14 and fatalities. The choice is simple. Maryland should not gamble that high-risk, aged
15 pipelines will continue to provide reliable service until electrification occurs. Federal
16 pipeline safety standards demand replacement action. As recently as January 2024,
17 PHMSA reported to Congress that "[r]eplacement is the long-term solution to ensure
18 [cast iron] pipeline integrity."³¹ Any proposed "alternatives to replacement" are
19 simply inadequate and would leave Maryland natural gas pipelines non-compliant with
20 federal guidelines.
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Climate Change Has Not Diminished Pipeline Replacement's High Priority

The Call to Action remains an ongoing national concern. Congress enacted the Pipeline Safety, Regulatory Certainty, and Job Creation Act of 2011, requiring the Secretary of

³¹Letter to Senator Cantwell from Deputy PHMSA Administrator Tristan Brown dated August 30, 2024, attaching Report on "Integrity Assessment of Distribution Pipelines" at App. D dated January 2024. <https://www.PHMSA.dot.gov/sites/PHMSA.dot.gov/files/2024-09/Report%20to%20Congress%20-%20Integrity%20Assessments%20of%20Distribution%20Pipelines.pdf>.

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1 Transportation to conduct a survey to measure the progress that operators were
2 making in replacing cast iron gas pipelines, which PHMSA keeps current on its
3 website.³² Although it has been more than a decade since the Department of
4 Transportation's initial Call to Action, the Department appears to remain laser focused
5 on ensuring that high risk pipe is removed from the natural gas distribution system as
6 soon as possible. The initial Call to Action, follow up reports, Safety Alerts and
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Advisories all remain in effect.

Moreover, the recently enacted Bipartisan Infrastructure Law of 2021 authorized a
new Natural Gas Distribution Infrastructure Safety and Modernization Grant Program
to repair, rehabilitate or replace municipal or community-owned distribution pipeline
systems to reduce safety incidents and avoid economic loss. The law appropriated \$1
billion to that cause for fiscal years 2022 through 2026, and PHMSA has issued more
than \$500 million in grants to communities and municipalities. It has granted funding
to the City of Richmond and Philadelphia Gas Works ("PGW"), that have systems that
are similar in age and composition to parts of Maryland. As shown by Congress' action
and the PHMSA grants, replacement of high-risk pipe is an ongoing concern and focus
of federal safety activity.

In recent years, PHMSA has seen its authority expand to include minimizing
greenhouse gas ("GHG") emissions. Congress passed the Protecting our Infrastructure
of Pipelines and Enhancing Safety Act of 2020 ("PIPES Act 2020") to strengthen

³² Public Law 112-90, 125 stat 1904 (Jan. 3, 2012).

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1 PHMSA's jurisdiction to minimize methane emissions to improve public safety and the
2 environment. This expansion of authority was in response to the national goal to
3 address climate change in keeping with its aggressive climate-related timelines. One
4 important mechanism to reach that goal is to reduce the GHG emissions associated
5 with the transportation of natural gas by pipeline. PHMSA has issued regulations that
6 expedite actions to address leaks on natural gas distribution facilities to reduce
7 methane emissions. The need to replace high risk pipelines is consistent with these
8 guidelines. In its June 2021 Advisory Bulletin addressing methane leaks, PHMSA
9 reiterated that, in addition to addressing emissions, the PIPES Act of 2020 also
10 "requires [operator's plans] to address the replacement or remediation of pipelines
11 that are known to leak due to their material (including cast iron, unprotected steel,
12 wrought iron, and historic plastics with known issues...49 U.S.C. 60108(a)(2)(E))."³³
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20 In addition to DOT, other federal agencies, too, have remained committed to natural
21 gas pipeline modernization. In 2014, for example, DOE launched a Natural Gas
22 Infrastructure Modernization Initiative to improve safety and reduce methane
23 emissions by, among other ways, accelerating pipeline replacement. In 2016, NARUC
24 and DOE initiated a 3-year technical partnership on accelerating infrastructure
25 modernization and repair to gas distribution pipelines. From 2016 until 2024, the
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") oversaw a Voluntary Methane Challenge
Partnership with local distribution companies ("LDCs") many of which committed to

³³ See PHMSA Advisory Notice, Pipeline Safety: Statutory Mandate to Update Inspection and Maintenance Plans to Address Eliminating Hazardous Leaks and Minimizing Releases of Natural Gas from Pipeline Facilities (Jun. 3, 2021), https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/sites/phmsa.dot.gov/files/2021-06/PHMSA%20Advisory%20Bulletin%20-%20PIPES%202020%20Section-114_0.pdf.

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1 pipeline replacement projects to decrease methane emissions. While reducing
2 methane emissions has become an important federal policy, this has not meant a move
3 away from accelerating pipeline replacements. Indeed, pipeline replacements play a
4 key role in reaching that goal, as acknowledged by many federal agencies and
5 Maryland (*e.g.*, by enacting its 2022 Climate Solutions Now Act). Accelerated pipeline
6 replacement through STRIDE already provides a double win – improving public safety
7 and addressing GHG emissions. The modifications proposed at this time, however,
8 would erode the ability of gas utilities to achieve the same pace of emissions
9 reductions going forward.
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15 It is in the best interest of Maryland and all states to keep all alternative energy options
16 open and to maintain energy diverse sources as the new energy future develops. The
17 reliable and safe provision of natural gas service, in particular for purposes of heating, is
18 an energy security issue. Other states that do not maintain a robust natural gas
19 distribution system have faced severe and significant consequences during extreme cold
20 weather events in recent years. In particular, states such as Texas are struggling to bring
21 power to their electric grid and maintain service reliability during winter months. A
22 pointed, close-to-home reminder of the importance of energy diversity and the
23 challenges to electrification occurred during Winter Storm Elliott over the 2022
24 Christmas holiday weekend. During this event, PJM Interconnection, LLC was barely able
25 to maintain service in its 13-state Mid-Atlantic service area. Relatedly, the North
American Electric Reliability Corporation recently reported in its annual long-term
reliability assessment that half of the United States is at a high risk of an electric power

1 shortfall in the next decade.³⁴ The need for Maryland to continue to maintain safe and
2 reliable gas distribution infrastructure into the future is further supported by these
3 realities.
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8 Maryland may ultimately need to meet its climate goals through a combination of
9 approaches beyond its current focus on electrification, given the challenges the state is
10 experiencing with generation availability and affordability, and natural gas distribution
11 companies across the Nation and the world are piloting projects to use existing natural
12 gas infrastructure to transport hydrogen and renewable natural gas as part of a lower
13 carbon future. The United States' extensive existing natural gas pipeline infrastructure
14 makes it an ideal candidate for those energy alternatives should they prove
15 technologically and financially feasible. It is important for Maryland to prepare itself for
16 that future by replacing vintage materials.
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22 **Conclusion**

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24 I urge this Committee to continue to support the STRIDE Act and not back away from
25 continuing accelerated removal of high-risk natural gas pipe as Maryland advances its
climate goals. In addition, I suggest that the state ensures that all affected agencies

³⁴ <https://www.nerc.com/news/Pages/Urgent-Need-for-Resources-over-10-Year-Horizon-as-Electricity-Demand-Growth-Accelerates,-2024-LTRA-Finds.aspx>

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1 prioritize removal of high-risk pipe in the fastest, safest, most environmentally
2 responsible, and least costly manner possible for Maryland residents.
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6 It is of the utmost importance that all pipes be operationally safe and reliable when
7 customers require service. Replacement of high-risk pipelines are clearly necessary to
8 ensure their safety and reliability in Maryland. Since the Call to Action was issued,
9 Maryland's cast iron replacement has lagged somewhat behind that of the average state.
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12 It is not time to turn back now, but instead for Maryland to continue its efforts. In
13 addition to cast iron, the Maryland pipeline system contains other high-risk pipeline that
14 PHMSA has targeted for removal, including bare steel, vintage mechanically coupled
15 wrapped steel pipe, wrapped steel pipe without cathodic protection, copper pipe and
16 pre-1975 vintage plastic pipe. It is imperative for public safety that the Maryland
17 legislature continue the STRIDE Act to fund removal of vintage pipe in Maryland, and that
18 it seek to remove barriers that would reduce the effectiveness of this regulatory tool that
19 is so critical to public safety.
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