

ERISA Preemption of Maryland House Bill 321

ERISA preempts any state law that “relates to” an ERISA-covered employee benefit plan. ERISA § 514(a). As recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States, a central purpose of ERISA’s broad preemption provision is to allow for the uniform administration of ERISA plans. *See, e.g., Egelhoff v. Egelhoff*, 432 U.S. 141, 148 (2001) (holding that ERISA preempted a state statute governing beneficiaries under an ERISA plan). A state law “relates to” a plan, and implicates preemption, when it has a “connection with or reference to” an ERISA plan. *Id.* at 147. The Supreme Court has made clear that a central purpose of ERISA’s broad preemption provision is to allow for the uniform administration of ERISA plans. *See, e.g., Egelhoff v. Egelhoff*, 432 U.S. 141, 148 (2001) (holding that ERISA preempted a state statute governing beneficiaries under an ERISA plan).

The Supreme Court clarified two main categories of state law that ERISA would preempt: (1) “where a state’s law acts immediately and exclusively upon ERISA plans or where the existence of ERISA plans is essential to the law’s operation” and (2) where there is “an impermissible connection with ERISA plans [which] govern a central matter of plan administration.” *Gobeille v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.*, 577 U.S. 312, 319-320 (2016) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Notably, the state law at issue in *Gobeille* applied to the third-party administrator (“TPA”) acting on behalf of the ERISA-covered plan. In recognition of the statutory “deemer clause,” which prevents states from “deeming” a self-insured, ERISA-covered plan to be an insurer for purposes of the insurance savings clause, the Court held that the Vermont law at issue was preempted, notwithstanding the fact that it applied to the insurer acting as a TPA for the plan. ERISA § 514(b)(2). A state law may also be preempted if its economic effects force an ERISA plan to adopt certain coverage or restrict its choice of insurers. *See id.* at 320.

In *Rutledge*, the most recent Supreme Court case analyzing ERISA preemption, the Court affirmed both *Egelhoff* and *Gobeille* when reviewing a state law that regulates the reimbursement amounts PBMs pay pharmacies for drugs covered by prescription drug plans. *Rutledge v. Pharm. Care Mgt. Assn.*, 592 U.S. 80, 86 (2020). In a narrowly tailored decision, the Court held that the state law was not preempted by ERISA because it merely regulated costs rather than dictate ERISA-plan choices. *See id.* at 81. Instead, the Court focused squarely on the facts of the Arkansas cost-regulation while applying earlier Court precedent addressing the extent to which state-level cost regulation is preempted. Importantly, the Court was clear that prior precedent outside the context of indirect cost regulation remained intact and found that the state law did not govern a “central matter of plan administration” by increasing costs for ERISA plans without forcing plans to adopt certain rules for coverage. *Id.* at 80; *Gobeille* at 320. Moreover, the Court in *Rutledge* also reaffirmed the long-held view of the Court that a state law “which requires employers to pay employees specific benefits, clearly ‘relate to’ benefit plans,” and are thus subject to preemption. *Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.*, 463 U.S. 85, 97 (1983); *Rutledge*, 592 U.S. at 86-87.

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More recently, the Tenth Circuit properly read *Rutledge* as being limited to indirect cost regulation. In *Mulready* the court examined an Oklahoma state law that imposed regulations on PBMs and pharmacy networks in an effort to establish minimum and uniform guidelines regarding a patient’s right to choose a pharmacy provider. *PCMA. v. Mulready*, 78 F.4th 1183, 1190 (10th Cir. 2023). The state law included four key provisions that subjected PBMs to certain rules including pharmacy access network standards and restrictions on the incentives given to individuals who fill prescriptions at in-network pharmacies. *See id.* at 1190-1191. The court held that all four provisions were preempted by ERISA because they had an impermissible connection with ERISA plans by mandating certain benefit structures related to a key benefit design (*i.e.* the scope and differentiation of the plan’s pharmacy network benefit). *Id.* at 1199-1200. The court found that the Oklahoma law was an attempt by the State to “govern[] a central matter of plan administration” and “interfere[] with nationally uniform plan administration.” *Id.* at 1200.¹

MD House Bill 321

Maryland House Bill 321 (“HB 321”) seeks to impose certain of the state’s insurance laws governing pharmacy benefit managers (“PBMs”) on pharmacy benefit management services provided to ERISA-covered, self-insured group health plans. HB 726 and SB 626 accomplish this by eliminating current law limitations on the applicability of state PBM requirements to “carriers”. A number of these provisions should be preempted by ERISA based on existing Supreme Court jurisprudence, including *Rutledge*. In the following chart, we identify the specific legislative provision, provide a description of the provision, and include the basis for federal law preemption, assuming that the State seeks to impose these requirements with respect to self-insured, ERISA-covered plans.

<i>Proposed Statutory Provision</i>	<i>Description</i>	<i>Reason for ERISA Preemption</i>
Md. Code Ann., Ins. § 15-1611.1	Prohibits PBMs from requiring the use of pharmacies affiliated with the PBM.	This provision limits the ability of ERISA-covered plans to determine the scope of their pharmacy networks, which is inherent in the plan’s benefit design. Thus, the provision should be preempted because it requires a specific benefit design choice by the plan sponsor consistent with the holding in <i>Mulready</i> .
Md. Code Ann., Ins. § 15-1612(b)	Prohibits a PBM from reimbursing a non-affiliated pharmacy less than the PBM reimburses affiliated pharmacies.	This provision limits the ability of ERISA-covered plans to contract for high-value pharmacy networks, which is inherent in the plan’s

¹ Notably, the Tenth Circuit also squarely rejected the State’s argument that the state law in question was not preempted by ERISA because the law regulates PBMs rather than the actual health plan. *Id.* at 1194. Many courts have recognized that state laws regulating PBMs function as the regulation of an ERISA plan because most plans cannot operate without a PBM. *Id.* at 1195

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<i>Proposed Statutory Provision</i>	<i>Description</i>	<i>Reason for ERISA Preemption</i>
		benefit design. Thus, the provision should be preempted because it requires a specific benefit design choice by the plan sponsor consistent with the holding in <i>Mulready</i> .
Md. Code Ann., Ins. § 15-1629	Proscribes the manner in which PBMs may audit pharmacies and recover overpayments.	This provision could impose acute <i>and</i> direct economic burden on plans because it limits recovery of plan assets. Moreover, it could directly conflict with ERISA's fiduciary duty to act solely in the interest of the plan. As a result, the provision addresses a central matter of plan administration and fiduciary obligation, and should be preempted per <i>Gobeille</i> .