

1 **COMMITTEE:** ENVIRONMENT & TRANSPORTATION

2 **TESTIMONY ON:** HB 1253

3 **POSITION:** OPPOSE

4 **HEARING DATE:** MARCH 10, 2026

5 Washington Gas respectfully submits this statement in **OPPOSITION** to **House Bill**
6 **1253-Gas Companies - Infrastructure Investments – Cost Recovery and**
7 **Customer Notification (Break STRIDE Act)**

8
9 **Introduction**

10 My name is Cynthia L. Quarterman, and I am an independent consultant to Washington
11 Gas Light Company (“Washington Gas” or “Company”). I served as the Administrator
12 of the US Department of Transportation’s (“DOT”) Pipeline and Hazardous Materials
13 Safety Administration (“PHMSA”) from November 2009 through October 2014.¹
14 PHMSA is responsible for oversight of the safe transportation of oil, gas, and other
15 hazardous materials by all modes of transportation, including pipelines. During my
16 tenure at PHMSA, I spearheaded DOT’s Call to Action, which encouraged state
17 legislatures and public utility commissions to remove high-risk materials expeditiously
18 from natural gas systems around the United States. PHMSA enthusiastically endorsed
19 this legislature’s adoption of the Strategic Infrastructure Development and
20 Enhancement Plan Act (“STRIDE”) in 2013. A representative of PHMSA’s staff
21 testified before the Maryland legislature at the time encouraging STRIDE’s adoption. I
22 testified before this legislature last February in opposition to proposed changes to the
23 STRIDE Act. I understand that since that time, this legislature made some changes to
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¹ Attached as an exhibit is a copy of my Curriculum Vitae.

1 the Act to provide customers with six months notice before construction and to require
2 gas companies to consider non-pipeline alternatives before pipeline replacement.
3 Those changes were reasonable and consistent with pipeline safety. This legislature
4 should be proud of its leadership in improving pipeline safety in Maryland, and I
5 encourage it not to abandon that course. Any attempt to rescind the STRIDE Act would
6 be a barrier to pipeline safety in Maryland.

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8 The purpose of my testimony is to discuss PHMSA's Call-To-Action and the history
9 surrounding that critical safety initiative and to encourage the continued support for the
10 STRIDE Act. Removing vintage and vulnerable materials on an accelerated basis is
11 sound public policy that is imperative to pipeline safety in Maryland. Not only is it
12 prudent to continue STRIDE without any additional roadblocks that could slow pipe
13 replacement, but it could also be catastrophic if Maryland adopted a "fix it first" strategy
14 that delayed replacement of vulnerable facilities and resulted in a pipeline-related
15 incident.

16
17 **History of The Call to Action**

18 The first and foremost mission of PHMSA is ensuring pipeline safety. During my tenure
19 as PHMSA Administrator, I witnessed several low probability, high consequence oil and
20 natural gas pipeline incidents that destroyed communities and caused catastrophic
21 injuries and deaths. One of those natural gas incidents occurred on September 10, 2010,
22 when a longitudinal seam on a 1956 era, non-industry standard steel natural gas
23 transmission pipeline operated by PG&E ruptured and devastated an entire
24 neighborhood in San Bruno, California, injuring 51 people, killing 8 and destroying 38
25 homes. Then on January 18, 2011, a break on a 1942 vintage 12-inch cast iron

1 distribution main caused an explosion and death of a utility worker in Philadelphia,
2 Pennsylvania. Shortly thereafter, on February 9, 2011, there was a catastrophic incident
3 on a 1928 vintage 12-inch cast iron distribution main operated by UGI in Allentown,
4 Pennsylvania, injuring 3 people, killing 5 and destroying 8 homes. The then-Secretary
5 of Transportation, Ray LaHood, and I visited the communities in San Bruno and
6 Allentown, met with those affected and saw first-hand the destruction that can occur from
7 a natural gas incident. Although the authority to oversee those pipelines had been
8 delegated to state oversight agencies, such as the Maryland Public Service
9 Commission,² so many harrowing pipeline incidents within a few months span caused
10 the Department of Transportation to lead a nationwide Call to Action to replace, repair
11 and/or rehabilitate the highest risk pipelines in April 2011.³

12
13 As a part of that Call to Action, PHMSA chaired multiple meetings to listen to stakeholder
14 concerns and encouraged expedited removal of the highest risk pipe. The materials
15 targeted specifically included cast and wrought iron, bare steel, copper, and certain kinds
16 of welded pipe.⁴ Secretary LaHood and I also delivered speeches before, and entreaties
17 to, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”), the National Association of
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19 ² In accepting the responsibility to assume pipeline safety authority in Maryland, the Public Service Commission
20 has accepted the responsibility to adopt the federal minimum safety regulations and guidelines issued by PHMSA,
21 as well as the authority to issue additional or more stringent requirements for intrastate pipelines. Maryland has
22 used that authority to issue its own pipeline safety laws and regulations compatible with those of PHMSA. Pub.
23 Util. Art. Annotated Code of MD, Sections 2-113, 2-117(a), 2-121, 5-101, 11-102, 12-101 through 113 & 13-203;
24 COMAR Title 20, Subtitles 55-57. Any interpretation of a regulation must be consistent with PHMSA’s. See
25 Guidelines for States Participating in the Pipeline Safety Program, revised Jan. 1, 2024, at 17,
<https://www.PHMSA.dot.gov/sites/PHMSA.dot.gov/Files/2024-State-Guidelines-with-Appendices-2023-12-18.pdf>.

³ See DOT News Release, “US Transportation Secretary Ray LaHood Announces Pipeline Safety Action
Plan,” <https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/sites/phmsa.dot.gov/files/docs/dot4111.pdf> (hereinafter “DOT Call to
Action News Release”).

⁴ See U.S. Department of Transportation Call to Action to Improve the Safety of the Nation’s Energy Pipeline
System,
<https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/sites/phmsa.dot.gov/files/docs/Action%20Plan%20Executive%20Version%201%20NOV%202011.pdf>.

1 Regulatory Utility Commissioners (“NARUC”) and individual state utility commissions to
2 ask for their support in identifying high-risk pipelines and accelerating pipeline
3 replacement projects through appropriate rate recovery mechanisms. PHMSA Staff
4 members also provided testimony before state legislatures, including here in Maryland,
5 encouraging them to enact laws to expedite the removal of high-risk pipe.⁵ Mechanisms
6 such as STRIDE remove operational and funding barriers to pipe replacement, allowing
7 utilities to do work that is critical to public safety as fast as possible.

8
9 PHMSA’s outreach to NARUC and state commissioners was considered critical to the
10 success of the initiative, so critical that Transportation Secretary LaHood addressed the
11 NARUC general assembly personally and I addressed the NARUC Gas Committee and
12 met with the FERC Chair and staff. The reason was because the Department recognized
13 that in order to make the Call to Action succeed, it needed the commitment of states to
14 dedicate themselves to prioritizing safe pipelines for the public. Pipeline operators must
15 have an environment that lowers operating and funding barriers that could delay the
16 replacement of high-risk pipelines. Because of the time delay in recovering costs using
17 traditional ratemaking authority, the Department encouraged alternative expedited
18 funding mechanisms such as the one adopted here in Maryland. Fortunately, some
19 states had already recognized the need for accelerated action and there were several
20 approaches for operators to consider when asking for additional funds to replace aging
21 infrastructure more quickly than previously planned. Maryland joined those states in
22 2013 when it enacted the STRIDE Act.

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25 ⁵ See Testimony of Linda Dougherty, PHMSA Pipeline Safety Deputy Administrator for Programs,
[HTTPS://mgahouse.Maryland.gov/mga/play/36ec44e5420945288e70a25d4641def21d?catalog/03e481c7-8a42-4438-a7da-93ff74bdaa4c&playfrom=2992130](https://mgahouse.Maryland.gov/mga/play/36ec44e5420945288e70a25d4641def21d?catalog/03e481c7-8a42-4438-a7da-93ff74bdaa4c&playfrom=2992130).

TESTIMONY
WITNESS QUARTERMAN

1 In my capacity as Administrator, I, and members of PHMSA's staff sent letters to every
2 state (including Maryland) with a pipeline safety program asking for the current status of
3 pipeline infrastructure and plans to expedite high-risk pipeline removal. In July 2012,
4 Maryland Public Service Commission Then-Chairman Nazarian updated PHMSA on the
5 status of the state's aging distribution infrastructure.⁶ At that time, there were 360 miles
6 of bare steel main, 2 miles of ductile iron main and 1,422 miles of cast iron main.⁷ The
7 Commission reported that it had been "actively pressing Maryland's gas distribution
8 companies to accelerate the replacement of cast iron, ductile iron and bare steel mains."⁸
9 It further said that the operators had "triaged these replacements based on risk analysis
10 and the determination that within Maryland bare steel is a greater threat than cast iron.
11 However, that does not mean that they are ignoring their cast iron mains."⁹ The reported
12 infrastructure removal programs of Maryland's six operators varied from 5 years to an
13 undetermined date, with the vast majority of the cast iron pipe in the undetermined
14 timeline. The Maryland legislature itself responded strongly by enacting the STRIDE Act
15 in 2013, allowing utilities to accelerate recovery for replacement of the state's vintage
16 high-risk pipe. By adopting STRIDE, Maryland was in good company with forty-one
17 states and the District of Columbia that also established some sort of state infrastructure
18 replacement funding mechanism as of 2019.¹⁰

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20 ⁶ See Letter from Maryland Public Service Commission Chairmand Douglas Nazarian to David Appelbaum, PHMSA Office
of Pipeline Safety date July 11, 2012.

21 ⁷ *Id.*

22 ⁸ *Id.*

23 ⁹ *Id.*

24 ¹⁰ See American Gas Association, "State Infrastructure Replacement Activity" Report, Oct. 21, 2019,
<https://www.AGA.org/WP-content/uploads/2022/11/agastatereplacementactivity.docx>; see also National
25 Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners, "Natural Gas Distribution Infrastructure Replacement
and Modernization; A Review of State Programs" report, January 2020,
[https://pubs.naruc.org/pub/45E90C1E-155D-0A36-31FE-
A68E6BF430EE?_gl=1*15x86qv*_ga*NzcvODg5NzI2LjE2ODQ0Mjg0NDI.*_ga_QLH1N3Q1NF*MTY5
Mjg0NTE4OS4yNTguMS4xNjkyODE1Mzg2LjAuMC4w](https://pubs.naruc.org/pub/45E90C1E-155D-0A36-31FE-A68E6BF430EE?_gl=1*15x86qv*_ga*NzcvODg5NzI2LjE2ODQ0Mjg0NDI.*_ga_QLH1N3Q1NF*MTY5Mjg0NTE4OS4yNTguMS4xNjkyODE1Mzg2LjAuMC4w); see also examples of local distribution
companies' programs to expedite removal of cast iron and unprotected steel pipelines, Department of

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Materials Targeted in Call to Action

The 2011 Call to Action came on the heels of seismic change in the views of safety regulators in light of increasingly undeniable evidence. Specifically, while there had historically been a rule of thumb that many pipeline materials had an approximate life span in the 50 to 60 year time frame, the philosophy had changed to suggest that as long as a pipeline asset was well maintained and subject to good operating conditions, its life might be indefinite. Nonetheless, incident data pointed to serious concerns about certain pipeline materials that had been installed during earlier eras of pipeline construction. The Call to Action arose from an assessment of the accumulating evidence. Distribution lines were especially targeted because of their proximity to the public. The closer a pipeline is to a residence, business, or gathering place, the more likely an incident is to cause injury or death. In 2011, when the Call to Action was issued, it was clear that many natural gas distribution pipelines were still relying on pipeline assets that were well beyond their initially forecasted life span.

The Call to Action targeted the highest risk pipelines for repair, replacement, or rehabilitation, but there were certain pipeline materials that were deemed inherently unsafe based on past experience and data. Included among that designation was bare steel pipe, cast and wrought iron pipe and certain early vintage plastic pipes. Cast iron pipe has been of particular concern. As a pipeline material, cast iron presents special

Energy, Office of Energy Policy and Systems Analysis, “Natural Gas Infrastructure Modernization Programs at Local Distribution Companies: Key Issues and Considerations” January 2017 at 31-2, Table 2,
<https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2017/01/f34/natural%20gas%20infrastructure%20modernization%20programs%20at%20local%20distribution%20companies—key%20issues%20and%20considerations.pdf> (hereinafter “DOE Modernization Analysis”)

1 challenges. It is an alloy of iron and carbon, which may not appear to be damaged when
2 it corrodes, but leaves “a brittle sponge-like structure of graphite flakes.”¹¹ “A completely
3 graphitized buried cast iron pipe may hold gas under pressure but will fracture under a
4 minor impact, such as being hit by a workman’s shovel.”¹² Such graphitization “allows
5 far more dramatic failure modes such as rapid crack propagation, and circumferential
6 breaks. Such failures are potentially more severe than more ductile failure modes
7 commonly seen in today’s pipe materials.”¹³ To further complicate things, cast iron
8 cannot be welded or cut during repairs. In addition, extraordinary measures are needed
9 to protect cast iron pipelines that have been disturbed. These measures, including an
10 elaborate series of efforts to protect it from damage from vibration, impact, earth
11 movement, outside forces, and future excavations, must be invoked as well as
12 permanent protection from external loads.¹⁴ The mere exposure of cast iron to
13 investigate its condition can lead to leaks that could pose a threat to public safety. The
14 extraordinary measures required near cast iron pipe make it a difficult material to work
15 around in the modern underground. To put it more simply, cast iron should not be
16 repaired; it must be replaced.

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18 Replacement – not repair – is consistent with long-standing federal safety standards.
19 Dating back to the early 1990’s, the National Transportation Safety Board (“NTSB”)
20 issued recommendations to PHMSA’s predecessor agency, the Research and Special
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22 ¹¹ See PHMSA Guidance Manual for Operators of Small Natural Gas Systems, January 2017 at III-5,
23 [https://www.PHMSA.dot.gov/sites/phmsa.dot.gov/files/doc/small_natural_gas_operator_guide_%28januar
y_2017%29.pdf](https://www.PHMSA.dot.gov/sites/phmsa.dot.gov/files/doc/small_natural_gas_operator_guide_%28januar%20y_2017%29.pdf).

24 ¹² *Id.*

25 ¹³ See PHMSA Part 192 Corrosion Enforcement Guidance at 150,
[https://www.PHMSA.dot.gov/sites/PHMSA.dot.gov/files/docs/corrosion_enforcement_guidance%27part192_1
2_7_2015.pdf](https://www.PHMSA.dot.gov/sites/PHMSA.dot.gov/files/docs/corrosion_enforcement_guidance%27part192_12_7_2015.pdf).

¹⁴ See 49 C.F.R. 192.755.

1 Programs Administration (“RSPA”), to:

2 Require each gas operator to implement a program, based on factors
3 such as age, pipe diameter, operating pressure, soil corrosiveness,
4 existing graphite damage, leak history, burial depth, and external
5 loading, to **identify and replace in a planned, timely manner cast-
6 iron piping systems that may threaten public safety.**¹⁵

7 RSPA issued twin safety alerts echoing the NTSB’s recommendations and reminding
8 operators that “[c]urrent pipeline safety regulations require that cast iron pipe on which
9 general graphitization is found to a degree where a fracture might result **must be
10 replaced.**”¹⁶ In addition, even if there is no immediate hazard, but the pipe is in
11 unsatisfactory condition, the operator is **required to initiate a program to recondition
12 or phase out the pipe involved.**¹⁷ Finally, it noted, any excavated cast iron pipe must
13 be protected against damage, such as enumerated above.¹⁸

14 Those decades old safety alerts remain in effect and are relevant to this day. What they
15 do not address is the practicalities of how to identify and survey effectively long buried
16 cast iron pipe that has not been exposed for another reason. Following the 2011
17 Philadelphia and Allentown incidents, PHMSA issued a further advisory bulletin
18 regarding cast iron distribution pipe.¹⁹ That advisory bulletin urged a comprehensive
19 review of an operator’s cast iron pipeline replacement program “to accelerate pipeline
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21 ¹⁵ See NTSB Pipeline Accident Brief No. DCA90FP001 (Aug. 6, 1991) (emphasis added).

22 ¹⁶ See RSPA Alert Notice, ALN-92-02 (Jun. 26, 1992),
23 <https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/sites/phmsa.dot.gov/files/docs/RSPA%20Alert%20Notice%2092-02.pdf>, see
24 also RSPA Alert Notice (Oct. 11, 1991)(requiring identification and replacement of cast iron piping systems
25 that may threaten public safety),
26 <https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/sites/phmsa.dot.gov/files/docs/RSPA%20Alert%20Notice%2091-02.pdf>; 49
27 C.F.R. 192.489.

28 ¹⁷ *Id.*

29 ¹⁸ *Id.*

30 ¹⁹ See PHMSA Pipeline Safety: Cast Iron Pipe (Supplementary Advisory Bulletin), 77 Fed. Reg. 57 at
31 17119 (Mar. 23, 2012), <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2012-03-23/pdf/2012-7080.pdf>.

1 repair, rehabilitation, and replacement of aging and high-risk pipe” and to “develop and
2 continually update and follow their plans[,] and **consider establishment of mandated**
3 **replacement programs.**”²⁰ Fortunately, most states, including Maryland, rose to the
4 occasion and put in place programs focused on replacing the vintage high-risk materials
5 such as cast iron.

6
7 More recently, cast iron incidents have continued to occur, causing fatalities and injuries.
8 The causes include rainfall after drought conditions, earth movement, freeze-thaw
9 cycles, water erosion, improper backfill and compaction causing overload conditions,
10 subsidence (*i.e.*, ground shifting), and leaks at joints.²¹ This performance is consistent
11 with what DOT noted in its report on “The State of the National Pipeline Infrastructure”
12 in 2011:

13 One material that continues to be the focus of concern is cast
14 iron...the small diameter cast iron pipes have low beam strength and
15 are particularly susceptible to stresses from underground
16 disturbances, such as ground movement, freeze-thaw cycles, soil
17 erosion, undermining due to water main breaks, or nearby
18 excavation activities. Most cast iron problems have been with small
19 diameter, thin wall pipe. Larger, heavier pipe typically performs well,
20 especially if not subject to graphitization...and when they have
21 limited exposure to excavation damage.²²

19 These incidents point to the relative fragility of cast iron pipes and the importance of their
20 expedited removal.

21 Cast iron is not the only material that contributes to the threat to public safety. The Call
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24 ²⁰ *Id.* at 17120.

²¹ See PHMSA Cast Iron Inventory.

²² See

[HTTPS://www.PHMSA.dot.gov/sites/PHMSA.dot.gov/files/docs/secretarys%20infrastructure%20report_revised%20per%20phc_103111.pdf](https://www.PHMSA.dot.gov/sites/PHMSA.dot.gov/files/docs/secretarys%20infrastructure%20report_revised%20per%20phc_103111.pdf).

1 to Action targeted all high-risk materials in the Nation's pipeline system that had been
2 deemed over time to be obsolete or had a history of poor performance. After construction
3 of cast and wrought iron pipe began to be phased out, bare or uncoated steel pipe
4 became the material of choice on distribution pipelines up until around the early 1960s,
5 when plastic pipe became available, and the early 1970s, when regulations required
6 steel pipe to be coated. The absence of any coating on a steel pipe to protect it from
7 corrosion caused by its environment can lead to consequential failures. Certain early
8 vintage plastic pipe, installed from the 1960s to the early 1980s, have also been found
9 to be vulnerable to brittle-like cracking. In addition to particular pipe materials, certain
10 construction practices, such as dated welding and joining techniques, have been found
11 to lead to leaks.

12
13 These concerns have only increased since. Although cast iron distribution mains only
14 account for 1% of all distribution mains, they are responsible for 9% of all main-related
15 incidents.²³ Cast and wrought iron main incidents are also twice as likely to cause
16 fatalities and injuries (38% vs 19% on mains made of other materials).²⁴ Moreover, cast
17 and wrought iron mains account for disproportionate numbers of fatalities and injuries on
18 gas distribution mains (34% vs 16% on other mains).²⁵ These failure data led to the Call
19 to Action.

20 21 **Achievements of the Call to Action and the STRIDE Act**

22 In the US, pipelines were first installed in the 19th Century to transport manufactured gas

23 See PHMSA Cast and Wrought Iron Inventory, <https://www.PHMSA.dot.gov/data-and-statistics/pipeline-replacement/cast-and-wrought-iron-inventory>., (hereinafter "PHMSA Cast Iron Inventory").

24 *Id.*

25 *Id.*

1 to fuel gas streetlights in Baltimore, Maryland. Eventually, natural gas was produced
2 and used for heating, and pipelines proliferated in the early 1900s. Prior to the 1940s,
3 those early systems – such as the systems constructed in Maryland and Washington,
4 D.C. – and the initial pipes were made of cast or wrought iron and, later, bare steel pipe.
5 At the time of the Call to Action, in 2011, more than 50% of the nation’s active pipelines
6 were constructed before the 1970’s in response to the post-World War II building boom.
7 The first pipeline safety standards were not adopted until 1968, meaning any pipelines
8 constructed before then were not subject to any standardized safety requirements. Not
9 surprisingly, the earliest heavily populated cities and states are home to some of the
10 oldest and highest number of pipeline miles made of high-risk material. As a first
11 adopter, Maryland is one of those places, and today it currently relies on the 6th largest
12 percentage (5.7% cast iron) of the highest-risk distribution main pipeline materials in the
13 nation to serve its energy needs.

14
15 At the end of 2011, there were 33,669 miles of cast/wrought iron gas distribution main
16 and 15,408 service pipelines, or approximately 3% of the national gas distribution
17 system.²⁶ Since the Call to Action, as of the end of 2024, there remained 14,608 miles
18 of cast/wrought iron main and 6,058 services, or approximately 1% of the gas
19 distribution system. In other words, more than 55% of cast and wrought iron mains
20 and services in the United States have been retired since the Call to Action.²⁷ There
21 are now 25 states and one territory that have completely eliminated cast and wrought
22 iron gas distribution pipelines.²⁸ If one looks back to the three states specifically cited

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24 ²⁶ See https://portal.PHMSA.dot.gov/analytics/sawdl?portalpages&portalpath=%2fshared%2fpdm%20public%20website%2fci%20miles%2fgd_cast_iron (hereinafter “PHMSA Cast Iron Analytics”).

25 ²⁷ *Id.*

²⁸ See PHMSA Cast Iron Inventory.

1 by PHMSA as having excessively long cast iron replacement programs, one finds that
2 in the twelve years between 2011 and 2024, Pennsylvania (with formerly a 100 year
3 program), New York (with a former 80 year program), and Connecticut (with a former
4 79 year program) managed to retire 44, 52 and 43 percent of their cast iron main,
5 respectively, which, if they continue the pace, will have them complete removal in
6 approximately 30 years. That is an astounding achievement for pipeline safety.

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8 The eight states with more miles of cast iron mains than Maryland in 2011 (accounting
9 for 24,790 miles or 72% of all the nation's cast iron mains), have since successfully
10 reduced their cast iron mileage by more than 50% (to 12,016 miles).²⁹ By comparison,
11 Maryland now has the seventh most cast iron with 63% of its cast or wrought iron mains
12 from 2011 remaining, leaving it behind the 43.3% average of all states that have since
13 removed cast iron pipes.³⁰ As recently as 2022, Maryland suffered two cast iron main
14 incidents in Baltimore resulting from failures of pipelines installed in 1904 and 1920.³¹
15 These vintage mains should not continue to fester. Maryland must continue to pursue
16 the expedited removal of cast iron, including eliminating barriers that slow the pace of
17 removal of cast iron where they exist.

18
19 Similar to cast and wrought iron, at the time of the Call to Action, 63,019 miles of bare
20 steel distribution main pipe and 2,859,197 services were in use. As of the end of 2024,
21 there were 33,573 miles of bare steel distribution main and 1,253,419 bare steel services
22 remaining. That amounts to a decrease of 47% in bare steel mains and 56% in services.

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25 ²⁹ See PHMSA Cast Iron Analytics.

³⁰ *Id.*

³¹ <https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/data-and-statistics/pipeine-replacement/cast-and-wrought-iron-inventory>

1 Compared to other jurisdictions, Maryland had a relatively small inventory of bare steel
2 pipe with 97 miles of mains and 48,310 services as of the end of 2024. That is down
3 from 361 main miles and 97,448 services in 2011, approximately a 73% and 50%
4 decrease of bare steel main miles and services, respectively. So, great progress has
5 been made in removing bare steel pipelines, especially with respect to mains, from the
6 Maryland systems compared to the remainder of the country. This legislature should be
7 proud of that achievement and stay the course.

8
9 **Leak Repairs of High-Risk Pipe Are Not Long-Term or Cost-Effective Solutions**

10 As mentioned above, these high-risk pipeline materials have been in use well beyond
11 their intended life span and may require extraordinary measures once they are
12 disturbed. Allowing such safety conditions to persist until a leak occurs would be
13 imprudent and could be catastrophic as indicated by past fatalities and injuries related
14 to cast iron pipelines. PHMSA has two separate safety programs that gas utilities must
15 comply with: one is for repair of leaking facilities; the other require the proactive
16 identification and replacement of pipes. For the first program, PHMSA requires that
17 pipeline operators survey their distribution pipelines periodically, identify leaks and
18 repair them based on the urgency of the leak. The repair of those leaks is within the
19 operator's regular operating and maintenance requirements. By contrast, accelerating
20 the replacement or rehabilitation of the highest-risk pipe addressed in PHMSA's Call
21 to Action requires operators to take extraordinary action beyond the wait-and-see
22 approach of merely plugging leaks. Wise safety management mandates a more
23 proactive replacement-focused approach. Solely repairing vintage facilities does not
24 accomplish PHMSA's pipeline safety objectives or those of the State of Maryland,
25 which has adopted those same standards.

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2 There is no question that replacing high-risk pipeline materials in Maryland has been
3 and will be expensive. However, when it comes to pipelines, safety must be Maryland's
4 top priority. I understand the desire to focus on the cost of replacing pipelines and how
5 that might affect rates. But there are also costs associated with ignoring safety needs
6 that could lead to catastrophic pipeline incident-related injuries and fatalities. The
7 choice is simple. Maryland should not gamble that high-risk, aged pipelines will
8 continue to provide reliable service until electrification occurs. Federal pipeline safety
9 standards demand replacement action. As recently as January 2024, PHMSA
10 reported to Congress that "[r]eplacement is the long-term solution to ensure [cast iron]
11 pipeline integrity."³² Any proposed "alternatives to replacement" are simply inadequate
12 and would leave Maryland natural gas pipelines non-compliant with federal guidelines.

13
14 **Climate Change Has Not Diminished Pipeline Replacement's High Priority**

15 The Call to Action remains an ongoing national concern. Congress enacted the
16 Pipeline Safety, Regulatory Certainty, and Job Creation Act of 2011, requiring the
17 Secretary of Transportation to conduct a survey to measure the progress that operators
18 were making in replacing cast iron gas pipelines, which PHMSA keeps current on its
19 website.³³ Although it has been more than a decade since the Department of
20 Transportation's initial Call to Action, the Department appears to remain laser focused
21 on ensuring that high risk pipe is removed from the natural gas distribution system as

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24 ³²Letter to Senator Cantwell from Deputy PHMSA Administrator Tristan Brown dated August 30, 2024, attaching
Report on "Integrity Assessment of Distribution Pipelines" at App. D dated January 2024.

25 <https://www.PHMSA.dot.gov/sites/PHMSA.dot.gov/files/2024-09/Report%20to%20Congress%20-%20Integrity%20Assessments%20of%20Distribution%20Pipelines.pdf>.

³³ Public Law 112-90, 125 stat 1904 (Jan. 3, 2012).

1 soon as possible. The initial Call to Action, follow up reports, Safety Alerts and
2 Advisories all remain in effect.

3
4 Moreover, the recently enacted Bipartisan Infrastructure Law of 2021 authorized a new
5 Natural Gas Distribution Infrastructure Safety and Modernization Grant Program to
6 repair, rehabilitate or replace municipal or community-owned distribution pipeline
7 systems to reduce safety incidents and avoid economic loss. The law appropriated \$1
8 billion to that cause for fiscal years 2022 through 2026, and PHMSA has issued more
9 than \$500 million in grants to communities and municipalities. It has granted funding
10 to the City of Richmond and Philadelphia Gas Works (“PGW”), that have systems that
11 are similar in age and composition to parts of Maryland. As shown by Congress’ action
12 and the PHMSA grants, replacement of high-risk pipe is an ongoing concern and focus
13 of federal safety activity.

14
15 In recent years, PHMSA has seen its authority expand to include minimizing
16 greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions. Congress passed the Protecting our
17 Infrastructure of Pipelines and Enhancing Safety Act of 2020 (“PIPES Act 2020”) to
18 strengthen PHMSA’s jurisdiction to minimize methane emissions to improve public
19 safety and the environment. This expansion of authority was in response to the
20 national goal to address climate change in keeping with its aggressive climate-related
21 timelines. One important mechanism to reach that goal is to reduce the GHG
22 emissions associated with the transportation of natural gas by pipeline. The need to
23 replace high risk pipelines is consistent with this goal. In its June 2021 Advisory
24 Bulletin addressing methane leaks, PHMSA reiterated that, in addition to addressing
25 emissions, the PIPES Act of 2020 also “requires [operator’s plans] to address the

1 replacement or remediation of pipelines that are known to leak due to their material
2 (including cast iron, unprotected steel, wrought iron, and historic plastics with known
3 issues...49 U.S.C. 60108(a)2)(E)).”³⁴

4
5 In addition to DOT, other federal agencies, too, have remained committed to natural
6 gas pipeline modernization. In 2014, for example, DOE launched a Natural Gas
7 Infrastructure Modernization Initiative to improve safety and reduce methane
8 emissions by, among other ways, accelerating pipeline replacement. In 2016, NARUC
9 and DOE initiated a 3-year technical partnership on accelerating infrastructure
10 modernization and repair to gas distribution pipelines. From 2016 until 2024, the
11 Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) oversaw a Voluntary Methane Challenge
12 Partnership with local distribution companies (“LDCs”) many of which committed to
13 pipeline replacement projects to decrease methane emissions. While reducing
14 methane emissions has become an important federal policy, this has not meant a move
15 away from accelerating pipeline replacements. Indeed, pipeline replacements play a
16 key role in reaching that goal, as acknowledged by many federal agencies and
17 Maryland (e.g., by enacting its 2022 Climate Solutions Now Act). Accelerated pipeline
18 replacement through STRIDE already provides a double win – improving public safety
19 and addressing GHG emissions. The modifications proposed at this time, however,
20 would erode the ability of gas utilities to achieve the same pace of emissions reductions
21 going forward.

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25 ³⁴ See PHMSA Advisory Notice, Pipeline Safety: Statutory Mandate to Update Inspection and
Maintenance Plans to Address Eliminating Hazardous Leaks and Minimizing Releases of Natural Gas
from Pipeline Facilities (Jun. 3, 2021), https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/sites/phmsa.dot.gov/files/2021-06/PHMSA%20Advisory%20Bulletin%20-%20PIPES%202020%20Section-114_0.pdf.

1 It is in the best interest of Maryland and all states to keep all alternative energy options
2 open and to maintain energy diverse sources as the new energy future develops. The
3 reliable and safe provision of natural gas service, in particular for purposes of heating, is
4 an energy security issue. Other states that do not maintain a robust natural gas
5 distribution system have faced severe and significant consequences during extreme cold
6 weather events in recent years. In particular, states such as Texas are struggling to
7 bring power to their electric grid and maintain service reliability during winter months. A
8 pointed, close-to-home reminder of the importance of energy diversity and the
9 challenges to electrification occurred during Winter Storm Elliott over the 2022 Christmas
10 holiday weekend. During this event, PJM Interconnection, LLC was barely able to
11 maintain service in its 13-state Mid-Atlantic service area. Relatedly, the North American
12 Electric Reliability Corporation recently reported in its annual long-term reliability
13 assessment that half of the United States is at a high risk of an electric power shortfall in
14 the next decade.³⁵ The need for Maryland to continue to maintain safe and reliable gas
15 distribution infrastructure into the future is further supported by these realities.
16

17
18 Maryland may ultimately need to meet its climate goals through a combination of
19 approaches beyond its current focus on electrification, given the challenges the state is
20 experiencing with generation availability and affordability, and natural gas distribution
21 companies across the Nation and the world are piloting projects to use existing natural
22 gas infrastructure to transport hydrogen and renewable natural gas as part of a lower
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³⁵ <https://www.nerc.com/news/Pages/Urgent-Need-for-Resources-over-10-Year-Horizon-as-Electricity-Demand-Growth-Accelerates,-2024-LTRA-Finds.aspx>

1 carbon future. The United States' extensive existing natural gas pipeline infrastructure
2 makes it an ideal candidate for those energy alternatives should they prove
3 technologically and financially feasible. It is important for Maryland to prepare itself for
4 that future by replacing vintage materials.

5
6 **Conclusion**

7 I urge this Committee to continue to support the STRIDE Act and not break away from
8 continuing accelerated removal of high-risk natural gas pipe as Maryland advances its
9 climate goals. In addition, I suggest that the state ensures that all affected agencies
10 prioritize removal of high-risk pipe in the fastest, safest, most environmentally
11 responsible, and least costly manner possible for Maryland residents.

12
13 It is of the utmost importance that all pipes be operationally safe and reliable when
14 customers require service. Replacement of high-risk pipelines are clearly necessary to
15 ensure their safety and reliability in Maryland. Since the Call to Action was issued,
16 Maryland's cast iron replacement has lagged somewhat behind that of the average state.
17 It is not time to break stride, but instead for Maryland to continue its efforts. In addition
18 to cast iron, the Maryland pipeline system contains other high-risk pipeline that PHMSA
19 has targeted for removal, including bare steel, vintage mechanically coupled wrapped
20 steel pipe, wrapped steel pipe without cathodic protection, copper pipe and pre-1975
21 vintage plastic pipe. It is imperative for public safety that the Maryland legislature
22 continue the STRIDE Act to fund removal of vintage pipe in Maryland, and that it removes
23 barriers that would reduce the effectiveness of this regulatory tool that is so critical to
24 public safety.
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TESTIMONY
WITNESS QUARTERMAN

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